

## **Article I - The Federation and the Bill of Rights**

1. The **Federal European Union** is formed by **sovereign** Citizens and States, participating in the Federation.
2. The powers not entrusted to the **Federal European Union** by the Constitution, nor prohibited to the States by this Constitution, are **recognised powers of the Citizens and entrusted powers of the States, in order to protect the autonomous initiatives of Citizens and States, relating to activities of personal or general interest.**
3. The **Federal European Union sees in the natural rights of every living being the only source from which agreed rights can be derived, such as formulated in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, whose rights shall have the same legal value as the Constitution.**
2. The **Federal European Union accedes and adheres to a World Federation on the basis of an Earth Constitution if that Earth Constitution is consistent with provisions of the Constitution of the Federation Europe.**

## **Explanatory Memorandum of Article I**

### **Explanation of Clause 1**

**The philosophical basis for Clause 1 is as follows. The Federation is all about sovereignty of the Citizens, the States and the Federation itself. Sovereignty means the right and obligation to 'reign'; not to 'govern'. This means:**

- **For Citizens to reign their households based on economic principles to attain prosperity through financial liberty; answering the question 'what' to do.**
- **For States to reign their households based on sociologic principles to attain wellbeing through cultural equality; answering the question 'how' to do 'what'.**
- **For the Federation to reign its household based on judicial principles to attain wellness through morality; answering the questions 'why' to do 'how' to do 'what'.**

**The Citizens, the States and the Federation form a vertical kind of trias politica: independent reigning spaces under the principle of subsidiarity, precisely defined, lest deliberations will produce unintelligible cacofonic noise. If not, Citizens' and States' thoughts will be quelled by hierarchical power play. Each of the three entities of that vertical trias politica should have and mind its own business for the sake of subsidiarity. The Federation as a whole needs protection against any (group of) Citizens or States with too**

**strong egoistic financial or cultural impulses breaking altruism, without which our communities remain or become 'animalistic' instead of 'humanistic'.**

**From a formal point of view, the sequence of establishing this constitution is as follows. Citizens of EU and other European states - vested with the right to vote - ratify this constitution by simple majority. It is up to the respective parliaments of those states to decide whether to follow the will of their Citizens. The States that follow the will of their Citizens thus establish the Federal European Union. This Federation has two possibilities of existence. Either alongside the intergovernmental European Union, or as a Federation within that European Union. After all, federal Germany, Austria, and Belgium are already members of the EU.**

**From a content point of view,** we take inspiration from the American and Swiss Constitutions. The text of the first Clause defines the specific nature of a public federation: it consists not only of States, but also and especially of their Citizens; a Federation is of the Citizens and of the States. For all those who fear that a Federation, as a purported superstate, would absorb the sovereignty of the participating member states, it should now be clear that within the **Federal European Union** the States remain as they are: France remains France, Estonia remains Estonia, Spain remains Spain, et cetera.

And there is more: by explicitly naming the Citizens as co-owners of the Federation, there is a constitutional mandate to consult them on proposed changes to the territory of the Federation. A right that the European Citizens have not yet received under the Lisbon Treaty: a form of direct democracy. We address this right in Article VII of our draft constitution.

The States are represented alongside the Citizens at the federal level of government. Their representatives have an individual mandate. They do not act in the name and on behalf of the political institutions of their State. This important principle in the functioning of the Federation is addressed in the organization of the European Congress consisting of two Chambers.

### **Explanation of Clause 2**

Clause 2 of Article I makes clear that the European Federation has a non-hierarchical vertical division of powers. **This creates 'shared sovereignty' between the States and the Federal entity: the States entrust the Federation with the use of some of their powers to look after common interests. These are interests that the States themselves cannot look after (anymore). Entrusting the federal authority with some state powers does not give it any**

## **hierarchical power, let alone enable it to intervene in the internal order of the States.**

Both the Federal and Member State authorities are sovereign in those matters assigned by the Constitution to both levels of government. In the sense that the Federation is assigned powers for a number of limited policy areas, no others. For lovers of historical best practice from the end of the 18th century, this principle of the vertical separation of powers (not to be confused with hierarchic powers) was already laid down in the first ten days of the Philadelphia Convention and further elaborated in a draft Constitution a few weeks later. It constitutionally establishes that the Federal Authority cannot exercise any hierarchical power over the States.

Those familiar with the Treaty of Lisbon, and more specifically with the partial treaty under the name 'Treaty on European Union', may ask 'What's new'? After all, that Treaty on European Union stipulates in Article 4(1): 'In accordance with Article 5, powers not conferred on the Union in the Treaties shall be conferred on the Member States'. This looks like two drops of water on our Article I, Clause 2.

But appearances can be deceptive. The subsequent Article 5 of that Treaty of Lisbon states that the delimitation of the Union's competences is governed by the principle of conferral. **This is what should NOT be done; the principle of conferral leaves far to many competence issues indeterminate:**

- Whether the Union has power to act is determined by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; that is to say, in short, the Union may act decisively in cases which the Member States themselves (or their component parts) could not (better) take care of; in other words, the principle of subsidiarity (leave to the States what the States themselves can best do) is not absolute, but relative.
- In the other part of the Lisbon Treaty - namely the 'Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union' - there are some articles that give a concrete list of the competences of the Union. But those articles are partly hierarchical in character, especially in the group of shared competences - these are competences allocated to both levels of government, but where the Union, when acting, obliges the Member States to conform to them. This does not exist in a Federation.
- As if all this were not enough, there are also subsidiary competences available to the Union, granted in Article 352 of the same 'Treaty on the Functioning of the EU'. This means that the Union can act if this is necessary to achieve an objective in the Treaties and if no other provision in the Treaty provides for measures to achieve it. This is called 'the flexible legal basis'. In our view, this is a manipulative and arbitrary key that fits every lock. Apparently, the European

Union cannot to this day abandon the technique of invoking the goal of 'ever-increasing integration' in order to seize power when it suits it.

Why does this not even remotely resemble federalisation? Let us discuss it again. Practice has shown for years that the principle of subsidiarity leaks badly. The Protocol preventing the Union from arbitrarily taking decisions outside the realm of its expressly granted competences, including the watchdog role of national parliaments in ensuring compliance with that Protocol, was already working very badly before the advent of the Lisbon Treaty. It has not worked at all since the entry into force of that Treaty in 2009, because from then on, the European Council took over principled decision-making. And nobody can stop that machine. Why is that? Because of the hierarchy we mentioned above: something once decided by the European Council means the obligation for the Member States to implement it uniformly in their own country: the source of assimilating integration. Not only is this alien to a federal system, but it is also unclear who is exclusively competent in what matters. It does say a few times that this or that authority has exclusive competence, but Articles 1 to 15 of the 'Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union' contain so many vague additions that there is no clarity, as there is in the American Constitution.

The Federal European Union does not provide that the Federal Authority can overrule the Member States. It confers on the Federal Authority an exhaustively enumerated set of powers and that is all. There is no hierarchy towards the Member States, nor any division of powers. Just like in the Swiss and US Constitution.

This is the essence of federalism: a true federation has shared sovereignty but not shared powers: each, the Federal Authority, and the Member States, has its own powers. This is the result of the first two weeks of debates in the Philadelphia Convention that began in late May 1787. The 'Virginia Plan', which James Madison had put on the table as the federalist opening piece, contained a Clause giving the federal authority the power to overrule 'improper laws' of states. There was an objection to this, made explicit in the 'New Jersey Plan', produced immediately afterwards. The parties subsequently resolved this dispute in the 'Great Compromise' by opting for a vertical separation of powers, expressed in a series of limitable powers of the federal authority: no hierarchy. Thus, no intervention from above if a member state performs its legislative or executive functions 'improperly'.

That's how it should be: in a federal system, the Member States are and remain sovereign in their own circles. Our Constitution therefore does not mention the principle of subsidiarity at all, for the simple reason that the exhaustive

enumeration (more on this later) of federal competences establishes subsidiarity in an absolute sense. The Federal Authority has no discretionary powers - let alone arbitrary powers - to determine for itself what Member States would not be able to regulate or achieve by themselves.

### **Explanation of Clause 3**

Immediately after the American Constitution came into force, the need for a Bill of Rights became apparent. **This came in the form of ten amendments to the seven-article Constitution. That Bill of Rights subsequently formed an annex to the Constitution. Our ten-article federal constitution does not contain a Bill of Rights either. We, too, refer to rights that apply by reference to other documents. It is as follows.**

**The third Clause of Article I sees the rights of European Citizens as deriving from natural rights. Man has no authority over these. Natural rights are self-evident rights. And what 'goes without saying' does not need to be explained. In addition to these rights by virtue of nature, we have rights by virtue of agreements made with the consent of all participants. In our modern time these agreements are laid down in Charters because they have a transnational character.**

**So, there is a division between natural rights and cultural rights. Natural rights do not need to be formulated, because to do so would be to erroneously state that they are adaptable or negotiable. This is only possible with rights derived from natural law that are laid down by men made agreement in Charters.**

**Clause 3 refers to Charters for those concrete, men made, cultural rights, without considering the Charters' various intergovernmental arrangements and references to intergovernmental institutions. It is not necessary, nor advisable to incorporate concrete rights already laid down in Charters literally into the Constitution. This is also to avoid the need to develop new case law and the consequently need to amend the constitution when jurisprudence gives cause to modify these cultural rights. In the event that the EU ceases to exist, the Federation can adopt the Charters - adapted or not - as its own human rights domain.**

**Post-totalitarian constitutions have always worked like this: they open themselves to international human rights treaties and thanks to these they manage to update the protection of fundamental rights without having to change the text all the time. To pretend to fix an exhaustive list of fundamental rights without referring to the human rights treaties or the**

**Charter of fundamental rights would end up frustrating the need to guarantee a high standard of protection to the rights themselves because the text of the constitutions gets old if it is not linked to the evolution of the international community. The history of constitutional law is full of referrals like this, we need to produce a document that has the ambition to work.**

#### **Explanation of Clause 4**

**Clause 4 establishes constitutionally that the Federation Europe sees itself as one of the building blocks of a World Federation. Only if the earth is governed by a world federation, supported by a number of (continental) federal states such as the Federal European Union, can geopolitically tensions, armed conflicts, and greed - causes of unprecedented human suffering (destruction of the earth, refugees, torture, migration flows, poverty, disease, illiteracy and more) - be overcome.**