Leo Klinkers, July 2019

The establishment of a state
The way in which a state is designed largely determines the question of whether the people within that state feel happy. A well-built state is no different than a well-constructed chair or a well-prepared meal. On a wrongly made chair you get back pain and a bad meal makes you vomit. It’s about craftsmanship, based on standards.

If we assume that a democratically-implemented state is the least bad form of government (Churchill’s words), there are still different constitutional and institutional forms. The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy in the form of a decentralized unitary state. France is a republic in the form of a centralized unitary state. Germany is a republic in the form of a federation.

I am now only talking about the creation of a federal state and base what follows on the ideas of political philosophers from Aristotle onwards, combined with a few examples from federal practice.

Popular sovereignty as a philosophical principle
A federation is based on a philosophical and a practical starting point. The philosophical starting point is based on popular sovereignty. In other words, all sovereignty rests with the people. This sentence dominated the Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the first federal constitution in America in 1787. In other words, for the first time in Earth’s history, a number of politico-philosophical considerations were contained in concrete binding law (constitutional) and a form of organization attached to it (institutional).

Those who do not accept that sovereignty rests with the people accept that all power is in the hands of an autocrat. And then the people are always the losers.

Representation of the people as practical principle
But the people cannot meet every day on the square to make all the decisions. So, it must be represented. That implies elections with the guarantee that they are free, can take place in seclusion and guarantee that minorities are also represented. The latter – representation of minorities – means that elections based on a district system with the adage ‘the winner takes all’ should be avoided in any case. See the misery with the two-party system in America and England.

The federal state from the bottom up
The sovereignty of the people plays in layers, from the bottom up. The first and bottom layer is the family. It can make decisions autonomously. However, the family has interests and/or concerns that it cannot control itself. It therefore asks a higher level – for example, a neighborhood body – to share the sovereignty of the family with some of the family’s powers in order to represent these interests/concerns. In this way, a federal state is built from the bottom up. From layer to layer.

A simple example: if, on the occasion of the World Cup football, many people in the Netherlands want to show the colour orange (which is the colour of the royal family), but not one family in the street can provide orange in the entire street, then an occasional body can be set up that, with a donation from all the families in that street, will provide a beautiful orange scene.

That is federal organizing. But the federal body that takes care of orange throughout the street does not have the authority to decide that only hamburgers may be served on the joint barbecue after the final victory, unless the residents of that street have granted that authority to that federal body. The powers of a federal body are always limitative and precisely defined. The fact that, in practice, public officials will always try to push the limits of these limitative powers and even go beyond them is not a characteristic of the structure of a federation, but of the quality of the people within a federation who are looking for more and more power. This is a characteristic of political functioning and not of federal organizing.

The most important values of a federal state: freedom and happiness
The most important value that the federal state must guarantee is to support the people in freely pursuing their own happiness. Nothing more and nothing less. In order to clarify the essence of this, I recently wrote a (new) preamble for a European federal constitution: see https://www.faef.eu/the-europe-of-the-citizens/.

A preamble to a constitution describes the values that need to be preserved and guarded. Next, the articles of the constitution determine how this preservation and monitoring will be guaranteed.

These concepts of ‘freedom’ and ‘happiness’ played a central role in the Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the first federal constitution eleven years later in 1787 in America. The concept of happiness within freedom then became the basis of those rules in the constitution that were to be called the ‘checks and balances’. Just as the English had curtailed the autocratic powers of King John Lackland in the Magna Carta in 1215, and the Netherlands in 1581 with the Declaration of Abandonment said adieu to the Spanish ruler, so the thirteen colonies in America in 1776 said that they would no longer wished to obey the English king. But to say that you want to be free is one thing, to make sure that this is legally valid is two. And that’s what they did by designing the federal constitution.

They knew from philosophers like Aristotle and Rousseau what popular sovereignty meant, they knew from Althusius what the building blocks of federal thinking were, they knew from Montesquieu what the trias politica meant and for the first time in the history of mankind they came up with a political form in which those different pieces of the politico-philosophical puzzle were put together.

The ‘trias politica’ and the ‘checks and balances’
But the ‘trias politica’ are just two words. The underlying meaning is as follows: ‘You shall separate the three branches of the state – the legislative, the executive and the judiciary – in order to prevent one from taking over the other and re-establishing autocratic rule’. However, they also knew that it would be inevitable that these three branches would have to intervene in the territory of others from time to time. So, the trick was: build in so-called ‘countervailing powers’. So, if one of the branches were to operate in the territory of another, that other branch would have to have the power to push that one back into its own territory.

They designed a brilliant system of checks and balances within a brilliant constitution. The most important aspect of the brilliant constitution was to make as few articles as possible. So not a millimeter of rules that would be about the interests of the individual states. Only the general interest of the thirteen should be regulated jointly. So they made a constitution of only seven articles, the core of which was a) the countervailing powers of the thirteen states vis-à-vis the federal body, b) the countervailing powers between the three branches within each state (it should be noted that in a federation the member states remain independent and each has its own legislative, executive and judicial power) and c) the countervailing powers between the three branches at the federal level.

A small example from the American constitution that Herbert Tombeur and I have adopted in the draft of the European federal constitution (see our European Federalist Papers 2012-2013): the legislative branch consists of the House of Citizens and the Senate. Both can make laws. If the House drafts a law, it must be submitted to the Senate. If it rejects it, they have to start over. If both Houses agree it goes to the President. He must decide within ten days: agreement or a well-founded veto. If a veto, then return to the House which either throws it away or accepts it again by a two-thirds majority, with or without adjustment based on the President’s arguments. Then back to the Senate. Same procedure. If both bodies agree, the President must also accept it.

This structure is perfectly transparent. Whether or not it meets the value of the state supporting the people in their free pursuit of happiness does not depend on that structure but, once again, on the level of quality of the people/politicians in that structure. At the moment, we can see that the US President is trying, through an outdated and therefore retarded system of elections, to achieve autocratic monopoly. But it is precisely the ingenious system of checks and balances that puts him in his place.

Only if he succeeds in creating an international conflict – after provocations – in such a way that it becomes an armed conflict will he be the master of some constitutionally based ’emergency laws’. And then the ‘shit hits the fan’, because then he no longer has to answer to anyone. De-escalating action is now required. Although, if at all it will be possible to de-escalate the conflict with Iran created by Trump himself, he will immediately start a new conflict because he knows that he can only establish autocratic rule if he gets his hands on the emergency laws. On the other hand, I think it is conceivable that he will then start a new civil war within America, which he will lose anyway.

The rule of law as the core of a democratic state
As an administrator, being accountable to a people’s representative body is at the heart of a democratic constitutional state. This refers to the rule of law. That means: no one is above the law. If there is one principle that must be observed, it is this. It is one and indivisible with federalism. And thus, the absolute counterpart of the intergovernmentalism of the European Union.

In this intergovernmentalist system, administrators – based on a treaty instead of a constitution – take all the important decisions, binding on the citizens, without having to justify them to a transnational parliament freely elected by the people. Rousseau has already made it clear that within a democracy there will always be a tendency to turn it into an ‘elective aristocracy’, which then always tends towards an oligarchy. In this way, the most important functions are divided among themselves in a small circle.

These tendencies are to some extent present in every democratic state. Also, in the Netherlands. In scientifically substantiated figures: approximately 2.5% of the electorate (approximately 300,000 people) divide the most important posts among themselves in the political, administrative and official bodies, in the permanent and ad hoc committees, in science and in industry. Governing on the basis of a Coalition Agreement strengthens this process to the detriment of the strength of the parliament that must be in place as the representative of the adage ‘all sovereignty rests with the people’, which implies that the executive power is always accountable to the parliament. But in reality, the parliament is there to cover the pre-cooked measures of the Coalition Agreement. Only when a minister operates too bad, he or she will be sent away. The way in which the executive power determines what the legislative power of the House of Representatives should find and decide has now also reached the decision-making spectrum of the Senate. It is no longer a body that, regardless of the political delusion of the day, assesses whether a law is good or bad, but follows – albeit often under protest – what the Coalition Agreement prescribes.

This is extremely important in an intergovernmentalist system such as that of the European Union. Look again at the way in which two to three leaders of the European Council recently set aside the ‘Spitzen Candidates’ earmarked by the European Parliament for the Presidency of the European Commission, preferring someone who would not endanger the unbridled power of the European Council.

In the long run, any intergovernmentalist system will crack and squeak, conflicts will arise because there is top-down government without accountability, Member States do not comply with agreements under treaty law, decisions are not taken on the basis of a vision of the general European interest of the Member States as a whole, but on the basis of an exchange of the national interests of nation states. And then we have to wait for the ignition of the fuse in the powder keg.

The Convention of Philadelphia
Between 1776 and 1787, the 55 members of the Philadelphia Convention realized this. The thirteen states were about to attack each other with weapons. What was done? Contrary to the task of repairing the errors in the treaty, they threw away their confederal treaty and in two weeks they came up with the basis for designing a draft federal constitution. They took a few more months to work it out and presented it to the people of the thirteen states. If the people of nine states agreed, the federation would legally enter into force. And that took place in 1789.

Federalists have been making, for many decades, a classic mistake in their pursuit of a federal Europe. A mistake that stubbornly blocks the intended result – a federal Europe. That is the repeated and pointless attempt to adapt the treaty basis of the intergovernmental EU system in such a way that it automatically becomes a federation. Well, you may disagree as to whether an apple is tastier than a pear, but there is no point in disagreeing as to whether you can turn an apple pie into a pear pie.

There is only one way to create a federal Europe, and that is to follow exactly the same procedure that the founding fathers of the Philadelphia Convention did in 1787: throw the treaty in the bin, never look after it again and, from the point of view of European philosophers, design a federal constitution in accordance with the standards that apply to it: from, for and by the people. I could also put it another way: because the standards are known, but two hundred years after the first federation in 1787, and seventy years after the Second World War, there is still no European federation, then there has always been a wrong way of operating. Time to stop pumping around opinions and to start studying how things should be done. Namely as the founding fathers did in 1787.

Exactly the same procedure should be used for the United Nations. Stop making pointless attempts to amend the UN Charter so that the UN can finally become a federal body that provides for a number of common interests that individual Member States can no longer take care of on their own. All the energy that is directed towards the wrong construction will only lead to more back pain and the need to vomit. These include the 60 million refugees in camps and the many refugees who are drowning in the Mediterranean. The recent appeal by the United Nations to the European Union to resume rescuing refugees in that sea marks the meaningless control of both intergovernmentalist operating systems. They are at the end of their political life cycle and therefore belong in the bin. Trying to repair system errors in a non-functional treaty only leads to new problems in the 2-4-8-16 series and so on.

The concept ‘federalism’ and the most important standards
Federalists have an inexhaustible tendency to speak out on policy issues in endless debates. However, there is no federal agricultural policy, no federal migration policy, no federal education policy and so on. You do not have to be a federalist to have a particular view of a particular political and social issue. In other words, federalism is not about specific policies, but only about the way in which cooperation between independent entities is regulated in legal and organizational terms. When it comes to a combination of states, it is the organization of the state. When it comes to private cooperation, such as the relationship between individual football clubs, their national federal bond, their European UEFA bond and their FIFA as a world bond, we are talking about a private federation. There are many hundreds of them in Europe. Big and small. But after 200 years of complaining, there is still no federal Europe. Why not? Because there is no craftsmanship. European federalists lack sufficient knowledge how to make a federal Europe.

Providing craftsmanship requires a) acquiring fundamental knowledge about elementary federalism (i.e. the task of educating the federalists), b) increasing the degree of organization of all single federal movements (i.e. federating the federalists) and c) building a federal Europe with the standards of federalism (i.e. applying standard operational procedures). And zero energy to spend on things that have nothing to do with it.

Not only is there no federalist policy, but there is also no diversity of federal systems, contrary to what many federalists claim. Some talk about Dual Federalism, Co-operative Federalism, Competitive Federalism,’Fiscal Federalism, New Federalism and other inventions. Nonsense.

There is only one concept of ‘federation’, based on standards. If these standards are 100% adhered to, it is a strong federation. If one is unwilling or unable to adhere 100% to these standards – as is the case with the Belgian federation, for example – then we are dealing with a weak federation. The further one deviates from the standards, the greater the risk of the federation collapsing. This has happened a few times in Africa, Asia and Europe. Nevertheless, 40% of the world’s population now lives in 27 – partly strong, partly weak – federations. It is this way of talking about federalism, which deviates from the standards, that has led some federalists to the misconception that ‘the intergovernmentalist EU also looks like a federation’.

The most important standards are:

• The people of a collection of independent states decide to form a federation. They do so because there are interests and concerns that individual states can no longer take care of themselves.
• The people of the member states ratify a federal constitution – from, for and by the people – that defines the limitative powers of the federal body and the articles that guarantee the checks and balances.
• The Member States themselves remain sovereign, independent with their own cultural identity, i.e. with their own parliament, government, judiciary, their own monarchy if any, their own tax system, their own policy areas.
• They allow a federal body to share in that sovereignty by means of a vertical separation of powers. In other words, the federal body may, with the powers of the Member States, deal with those limitative matters of which the Member States say: ‘Please, would you look after that for us, because we can no longer take care of that ourselves’.
• Both the Member States and the federal body have parliaments. The executive power of the federal body is accountable to it.
• Unlike in America, for example, the members of the federal parliament are elected transnationally on the basis of proportional representation.
• What the policies of that federal state will be depends on the members of that parliament. The political composition of the parliament determines whether Europe will be a fortress or whether it has open borders. Whether or not a joint army will be deployed in areas of conflict. Whether the sanctions against other states will be continued or abolished. Whether or not agricultural subsidies will be phased out.
• One can speak of ‘the policy of a federation’, but not of ‘federalist policy’.

Within the use of standards there is room to vary. Two examples. In one federation one can conclude that foreign affairs as a whole must be at the federal level. In other federations, for example in Belgium, foreign affairs have been identified as a common interest to be promoted by the federation, but Flanders and Wallonia are allowed to pursue their own foreign policy for subjects that do not fall under the federal authority. Another example concerns the tax system. Normally, a fiscal union is built within a federation. For example, in America. The Member States levy tax for the federal body and therefore pay it off. The federal body pays out money to the Member States in the event of investments or calamities. In practice, it may then be the case that a Member State pays more federal tax one year than it receives benefits in return, and the opposite situation the following year. The Member States themselves retain their own tax systems and are allowed to compete with them. Texas, for example, tries to attract with low rates companies and individuals from California, which has the highest rates. These examples therefore relate only to space that exists within fixed standards for the construction of a federation.

In short: striving for a federal Europe is only the professional construction of a safe and sustainable house. Which furniture should be in that house is not a property of a federation, but of the taste of those who are going to live in it.

Our assignment and task
And that – the construction of the federal house – is what still needs to be done in Europe: zero energy spending on the senseless attempts to transform the Lisbon Treaty into a federation. This will exacerbate the internal conflict, the external weakness of the geopolitical position and the antagonistic cooperation on policy issues that have to be considered in the general interest, even more than is already the case.

Here, too, is a task for the world’s federalists to stop trying to amend the UN Charter and, above all, to stop spending all their energy on considering policy issues, however essential they may be for the survival of our Earth. These important issues can only be addressed within a state structure that acts on the basis of the common interest of the Member States.

If countries want and need to cooperate but are no longer able to control certain interests or concerns on their own and still want to remain sovereign, then only a federal state can guarantee this. An intergovernmental operating system cannot do that. Making Europe a federation, building a federal house in which those policy issues are in good hands, that is the task we face.

This task can only be carried out successfully if the approach to the pursuit of a federal Europe changes in accordance with the adage: ‘If you continue to do today what you did yesterday, you will get the same results tomorrow as you received today. If you don’t like those results, you have to change today. Then you will get different results tomorrow. Change starts with yourself. If you don’t, why would your neighbor want to change?’

I hope that this brief note will provide some clarity about standards of federalism. Supporting information can be found in ‘Connectivity, Security and Prosperity’, trailer: https://www.faef.eu/trailer/. It also contains a draft of a ten-article federal constitution for Europe and a scenario for a Citizens’ Convention in accordance with the set-up of the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, the founding fathers of the first federal constitution.

Leo Klinkers, 22 June 2019

According to media reports, the European summit of 20 June 2019 on appointing candidates to succeed Donald Tusk and Jean Claude Juncker ended in a deadlock. Nothing could be further from the truth. At least from the perspective of the three protagonists Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron and Mark Rutte. They play the power game exactly according to the classic rules.

Rule 1: first eliminate the candidates who are not (or are not allowed to be) eligible. That worked out well on 20 June. The three ‘Spitzen’ candidates, earmarked by the European Parliament, have been rejected.

Rule 2: then discuss in a small group the way in which the real candidates – who have been known already – can be put forward. Merkel, Macron and Rutte will go to the G20 in Japan on 28 and 29 June and will hold these discussions there, far beyond the Brussels limelight. And also to consult some of the G20 key players about the appointment of Rutte as President of the European Council.

Rule 3: launch Mark Rutte at the Brussels summit on 30 June as a candidate to succeed Donald Tusk. The reason for the appointment of Rutte is the interest of Merkel, Macron and Rutte in exchanging the principle of unanimity of decision-making in the European Council for majority voting in order to make it easier to decide on the imposition of sanctions on a country like Iran, for example. See my article about Macron and Rutte.

Rule 4: At the same time, to succeed Juncker, they are nominating a candidate from a small country, such as Greece. As a reward for the efforts to put the financial situation in that country back in order. By appointing the Dutch Rutte as President of the European Council, the Dutch Frans Timmermans will not be able to succeed Juncker. The real reason is that the very ambitious Timmermans as President of the European Commission would pose a permanent threat to any President of the European Council. 

Leo Klinkers, 25 May 2019
Federal Alliance of European Federalists (FAEF)

The European Union has some Member States that are unwilling – or unable – to meet their budgetary commitments. That is why there are financial transfers from rich to poor Member States. Opponents of a federal Europe base their view on the proposition that a federal form of government would strengthen those financial transfers. Well, exactly the opposite is true. It is precisely with the creation of a federal Europe that the current conflictual situation of north-south financial transfers can come to an end.

To understand this, we need to go back to 1787, the creation of the United States of America. After the Declaration of Independence of 1776, the thirteen former colonies concluded a confederation on the basis of a Treaty, and each built its own state. That proved unsuccessful. They had no money, no good governance, no strong external relations and no common defence against external threats. After eleven years, it turned out that the confederal Treaty was unable to prevent or resolve the growing mutual tensions.

In 1787, a group of fifty-five persons in the Philadelphia Convention began executing a legal mandate from the confederal Congress to correct the errors in that Treaty. After two weeks they came to the conclusion that this was not possible because the Treaty itself was the cause of their internal conflicts and their weak geopolitical position. As is the case today in the EU with the Treaty of Lisbon.

The Convention decided on its own authority to throw the Treaty into the dustbin and made the world’s first federal Constitution. Instead of falling apart, they eventually became fifty sovereign states, united by a federal Constitution, with an unmistakably strong geopolitical position.

In order to gain the support of the Citizens of the thirteen conflicting states for accession to the federal union, the Philadelphia Convention first submitted the federal Constitution to the Citizens themselves for ratification. By allowing the Citizens themselves to ratify the Constitution, they came as close as possible to the concept of ‘popular sovereignty’ of Rousseau. Within two years, the Citizens of the thirteen states had ratified the federal Constitution.

Money played an important role in this. Article VI of the submitted Constitution stipulated that the states that would join the federation would be released from their debts. From that moment on, these would be the debts of the federation: a one-off settlement of the debts. But after joining the federation, they would henceforth be responsible for their own finances. It was also a signal to the creditors that the debts would be paid off.

Aside: Herbert Tombeur and I have included this one-off debt settlement in our draft of a federal constitution for Europe. I refer you to our European Federalist Papers and to my book https://www.faef.eu/trailer/.

This, of course, raises the question: where will the federation get the money to take over the debts of the participating states? In America, this was achieved through the work of Alexander Hamilton, one of the three authors of the American Federalist Papers, and soon after the Constitution’s ratification becoming the federation’s finance minister. Hamilton was able to see the huge mountain of debt not as a problem but as an advantage. With, among other things, handy tax measures including taxes on luxury goods such as alcohol, the sale of land and import taxes, despite the initial resistance, he received enough money to clear his debts. He also managed to create a national bank to stabilize the national credit position and to play an active role in stimulating the economy. Today’s federal America owns about 24% of the combined national income of all Member States. The EU only 1%. This gives an idea of the financial strength of the federal part of America.

Aside: in section 1.5 of the 2012 Annual Report, the National Bank of the Netherlands clearly explained why and how the federal system in America was able to get the banking and economic crisis under control soon after 2008. The EU’s intergovernmental tampering with its ineffective financial system means a) that we are still far from a solution, b) the financial transfers from north to south are creating increasing conflicts and c) the EU is not able to withstand a possible new global financial crisis.

A one-off settlement of Member States’ debts – in line with the US example – makes it attractive to join a European federation. It corrects the mistake made by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 of creating the euro without a federal foundation, and it also puts an end to the quarrel between rich EU Member States who are increasingly reluctant to put money into the financial sinkholes of poor Member States who do not wish (or are not able) to comply with the budgetary obligations under the Lisbon Treaty and further agreements. (Incidentally, it is not only the poor countries that are failing to meet their budgetary obligations.) With such a one-off settlement, a federal Europe is not a transfer union.

It can be argued that this settlement will give poor countries a bonus for their bad budgetary behavior. But that is the price that Europe is paying for its failure to introduce this measure as early as the Treaty of Maastricht. If they had done that back then, we wouldn’t be in this financial mess by now.

The necessary federal budget can come from three sources: 1) from import levies by adapting the existing system to a federal system, 2) from federal taxes with simultaneous reduction of national tax rates and 3) from the introduction of the Spahn tax at federal level. The Spahn tax is an improved, but not yet introduced, version of the rejected Tobin tax, a form of taxation on money transactions in order to control the volatility of exchange rates.

As an aside, in 2004 the ECB rejected a proposal from Belgium to introduce the Spahn tax in Belgium on the grounds that it would be contrary to the Lisbon Treaty. In my proposal – to introduce the Spahn tax as one of the sources of a federal budget – there is no longer any question of a Treaty of Lisbon and this form of taxation could help to put an end to the uneven distribution of the financial burden between the Member States.

I invite readers to put forward ideas for improving these resources for a federal budget of the United States of Europe that is to be created. Ideas on the best institutional organization of the federal financial system are also welcome.

In this respect, we should be guided by the words of Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission from 1999 to 2004 and Prime Minister of Italy from 2006 to 2008: “Great reforms will make a great Europe”.

Leo Klinkers, 6 June 2019
Federal Alliance of European Federalists (FAEF)

Introduction
The recent election of the new European Parliament has been described in the media as a cry from ‘the Europe of the citizens’. This applies both to the citizens who care about Europe and to those who reject it. But both parties want to develop their own version of ‘the Europe of the citizens’ in a different way. The opponents are seeking the path of a radical dismantling of the European Union, back to the nation-state anarchy of previous centuries with their inevitable wars. The supporters advocate a radical renewal of European cooperation with improved sovereignty, security and solidarity.

This article offers Europe’s supporters a perspective in the form of a Preamble to a federal constitution for a European federation. It gives their version of ‘the Europe of the citizens’ a soul and a heart.

The Preamble
We, the citizens of the states [enumeration of participating member states],

I. Considering:

1. that the federation of the United States of Europe, which we hereby establish, has the mission and duty to support us as citizens in our quest for happiness in freedom;
2. that the federation should base the support of our quest for happiness

• on working restlessly to preserve the diversity of all forms of life on Earth,
• on unconditional respect for the diversity of sciences, cultures, ethnicities and beliefs of the citizens within the federation,
• and on human compassion for citizens from outside the federation who want to find their happiness within the United States of Europe;

1. that in the execution thereof it should bear witness to wisdom, knowledge, humanity, righteousness and integrity, in full consciousness that it derives its powers from the people, that all men on earth are equal, and that no one is above the law.

II. Considering furthermore:

1. that this federal constitution is based on the wealth of ideas, considerations and wishes of European philosophers – and of European political leaders after the Second World War – to unite Europe in a federal form of government;
2. that the federal system is based on a vertical separation of powers between the Member States and the federal body through which the Member States and the federal body share sovereignty;
3. that the horizontal separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers (trias politica) both at the level of the federal body and at the level of the Member States is guaranteed by a tight system of checks and balances;

III.        Finally, without prejudice to our right to adjust the political composition of the federal body in elections, we have the inalienable right to remove the authorities from the federation if, in our view, they violate the provisions under I and II,

Establish the following articles for the constitution of the United States of Europe,

Article 1 ….

Article 2 ….

And so on.

The Explanatory Memorandum of the Preamble

Preliminary
The opening words ‘We, the citizens of the states …..’ show that this constitution is being ratified by the citizens themselves. It therefore belongs by, for and of the citizens of the United States of Europe, in accordance with the adage ‘All sovereignty rests with the people’.

The United States of Europe consists of the citizens, the member states and the federal body.

It is a constitution and not a treaty. If countries or regions want to live together in peace and have to cooperate through historically defined borders, but nevertheless want to retain their autonomy and sovereignty, a federation is the only form of state that can guarantee this. This is not possible with a treaty. A treaty is an instrument for administrators to cooperate in policy areas without being fully-fledged democratically accountable for their decisions.

The fact that this constitution is first ratified by the citizens and only then by the parliaments of the member states shows that, in accordance with the basic aspects of federalism, formulated by Johannes Althusius around 1600, it is based from the bottom up and not imposed from the top down.

This federal constitution guarantees the common interests of the citizens of the United States of Europe and leaves to the citizens of the member states and to the member states themselves the powers to serve their own interests.

That is why this federal constitution consists of a limited number of rules of a general binding nature. It has no exceptions – driven by national interests – to these generally binding rules.

Explanatory note to Consideration Ia
The obvious ‘quest for happiness in freedom’ of the citizens and the mission and task of governments to support the citizens in this is a cornerstone of the Declaration of Independence (1776) and of the subsequent American Constitution (1787-1789), the first federal constitution in the world. This was the model for the federations that were set up afterwards and that currently house 40% of the world’s population. The pursuit of happiness is therefore also a cornerstone of the federal constitution of the United States of Europe. The quest for happiness includes values such as peace, security and social security.

Explanatory note to Consideration Ib
In the first place, this consideration gives the federation the task to work restlessly to preserve the diversity of all forms of life on Earth. Unsuccessful preservation of the diversity of all forms of life threatens the life of mankind on Earth. This task requires maximum cooperation, expertise and reliability from the federation’s authorities.

Secondly, the federation offers maximum respect for diversity in social life. Where it disappears, monocracies develop, which destroy those parts of society by inbreeding. Diversity of sciences, cultures, ethnicities and beliefs creates new sciences, cultures, ethnicities and beliefs. This constitution therefore rejects any action aimed at protecting the so-called ‘own people first’ and will use all legal means to combat such action.

Thirdly, as a consequence of the foregoing, this Preamble explicitly states that there is no room for a slogan such as ‘Europe first’. The federation of the United States of Europe shares its place on Earth with all other peoples and does not shut itself up behind the walls of a ‘fortress Europe’. Closing the external borders for the purpose of protecting one’s own people is not listed as a crime against humanity, but it is punishable by a serious penalty: the eventual disappearance – by demographic decay – of what one wishes to preserve. In other words: there will be open external borders, no closed borders. That creates obligations:

1. the design and implementation of plans such as the Marshall Plan (1948-1952) to support poor countries in their economic development in order to eliminate the need for seeking refuge in Europe;
2. with immediate effect offering a human existence to the approximately sixty million war refugees;
3. to strengthen Europe’s demographic and geopolitical position by providing – through wisdom, knowledge, humanity, justice and integrity – immigrants with a secure life within the federation;
4. to consider the implementation of a-c as one of the federation’s common interests.

This constitution is therefore a task and an opportunity for fundamental political renewal now that the post-war democracies have reached the end of a 70-year life cycle and have led to the exclusion of citizens in favour of treaty-based government, which by its very nature has become increasingly oligarchic and protectionist.

Explanatory note to Consideration Ic
The end of the political life cycle of the post-war democracies, mentioned above, places those countries that consider democracy to be of great importance on a tour de force, similar to the revolution of the Enlightenment. Democracy and the representation of the people must be reinvented on the basis of the principle of ‘All sovereignty rests with the people’.

The Treaty of Lisbon is giving way to a constitution based on the representation of citizens. This implies, among other things, the abolition of the European Council of Heads of Government and State, the creation of a European Parliament on the basis of proportional representation within one electoral district – the territory of the federation – and a government under the leadership of a President, elected by the citizens. So, equipped with a democratic mandate.

This can only be achieved with wisdom, knowledge, humanity, justice and integrity. With just two certainties: if it succeeds, it will be a crucial revolution for the preservation of Europe. If it fails, by the end of this century, after the last tribal war in Europe initiated by nation-state anarchy, someone will turn off the lights in Europe.

Democracies cannot prevent elections from leading to groups within the democratic institutions that wish to use their power against democracy. This constitution enables the institutions of democracy, as far as possible, to deal with the abuse of democratic procedures by building in defence mechanisms. The task is therefore a fundamental reorientation of the concept of ‘democracy’ in 21st century Europe. With a task for political parties to reflect on their own responsibility to design instruments to defend democracy against parties that (would like to) abuse the procedures of democracy in order to destroy that democracy. Probably more than any other organisation within a democratic system, political parties will have to consider wisdom, knowledge, humanity, justice and integrity in order to guarantee the viability of a federally united Europe.

Explanatory note to Consideration IIa
The ‘building blocks’ of federalism as a form of state stem from the ‘Political Method’ of Johannes Althusius (1603). The ‘cement’ to connect these ‘building blocks’ indissolubly was provided in the writings of European political philosophers such as Aristotle, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Locke with their views on popular sovereignty and the doctrine of the trias politica. The American federal constitution is based on these writings, while Europe has condemned itself to wars for centuries.

It was not only philosophers who provided the ‘cement’ for the building blocks of federalism. Also political and social leaders – in the Interbellum period for example the British Philip Kerr, better known as Lord Lothian – and after the Second World War the Italian Altiero Spinelli who, with his Ventotene Manifesto (1942), laid the foundation for the post-war pursuit of federalism. A goal that between 1945 and 1950 was led by a large number of conferences and plans led by statesmen, scientists, culture bearers and civil movements, but which in 1950 radically ceased to exist with the Schuman Declaration. Although this declaration demanded the creation of a federal Europe in its entirety, it put its implementation in the hands of government leaders. In this way – unintentionally, but through guilty ignorance of the way in which a federation should be created – the Treaty-based intergovernmentalism that has brought the European Union to the end of its current political life cycle was created.

Explanatory note to Consideration IIb
The thirteen former colonies in America at the end of the 18th century solved the dilemma of ‘never again a ruler versus the need for representation of the people’. They applied the system of shared sovereignty devised by Althusius by inventing the vertical separation of powers between the sovereign member states and a federal body. Without transferring the integral member state’s sovereignty, they asked a federal body to take care of a limitative number of common interests, to execute with the powers of the member states.

Contrary to the claim that in a federation member states transfer all or part of their sovereignty in the sense of ‘giving it away and thus losing it’, this is not the case. Parents who hand over their child to a teacher do not lose anything of their parenting but give the teacher the power to teach the child knowledge that the parents themselves cannot realise. That is why another popular view is also wrong. Namely the view that a federation is a superstate that destroys the sovereignty of the member states.

The vertical separation of powers, leading to shared sovereignty, also solves another problem. Namely, the principle of subsidiarity. This principle in the Treaty of Lisbon states: ‘The institutions of the European Union should leave to the member states what the member states can do better themselves’. Since Article 352 of the Treaty allows the European Council to take any decision that the Council considers serving the objectives of the Union, the Council can ignore this principle of subsidiarity. In a federal state, the principle of subsidiarity coincides with the vertical separation of powers and therefore does not need to be mentioned as such in the articles of the Constitution.  

A final aspect of this Consideration IIb implies that, due to the exhaustive range of competences of the federal body, all other competences remain with the citizens and the member states. This means, among other things, that the member states retain their own constitution, parliament, government and judiciary, including their own policy areas insofar as these have not been laid down in the exhaustive list of interests that the federal body must represent on behalf of the member states by means of the vertical division of powers. Monarchies are also preserved. 

Explanatory note to Consideration IIc
The horizontal separation of the three powers – the legislative, the executive and the judiciary – is not a specific feature of a federal form of state alone but is the adage of any state that wants to prevent domination by one power. Within a federation, however, there are two particularities.

Firstly, from the first federal state – that of the United States of America – the trias politica must be established both at the level of the federal body and at that of the individual member states. Secondly, in addition to the invention of the vertical separation of powers mentioned above, the federal constitution of the United States of America has introduced a second innovation: the checks and balances. To say that a self-respecting state considers the trias politica to be a very important aspect is only a declaration of its value. But values can only be monitored and preserved through norms. That is why the American Constitution – and also this European Constitution – contains articles that prevent the inevitable action of the three powers in the field of another power from slipping into the supremacy of one power over the other. That is the purpose of the checks and balances. They are the indispensable countervailing powers to limit the ever-present striving of the three powers to expand their complex of powers, at the expense of the powers of the others.

Explanatory note to Consideration III
The citizens derive from the English Magna Carta of 1215, the Dutch Plakkaat of Abandonment of 1581, the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789 the inalienable right to expel governments from the federal body if they violate the provisions under I and/or II.

In accordance with the adage ‘All sovereignty rests with the people’, the citizens of the United States of Europe are the alpha and omega of the federation. Alpha in the sense of: they ratify the federal constitution and thus establish a system of representation of the people, of executive administration on the basis of political decision-making by the representative body and of justice for the resolution of disputes. Omega in the sense of the inalienable right to dismiss those who abuse the federal system, for example by (attempted) establishment of an autocratic system.

Final
This Preamble contains the complex of values of the constitution of the United States of Europe. It shows what the United States of Europe stands for.

Then follow the constitution’s articles.

An interview by Olivia Muñoz-Rojas with Mauro Casarotto

Within the context of the upcoming European elections and the debate about the future of the EU, I interview Mauro Casarotto, secreatry of the Promoting Committee of the Federal Alliance of European Federalists (FAEF). Born in 1981 in Italy, he graduated in political sciences and international relations at Padova University, and has a long experience in non-profit organizations. In 2014 he published Krisis. Che cosa nasconde la più grande crisi del mondo occidentale (Armando Editore), where he explores some of the causes and possible solutions to the crisis of the Western world, which, he claims, is first and foremost a social and cultural one. A convinced European, he decided to involve himself in the adventure of ‘federating the federalists’ under a common umbrella in the face of mounting nationalism and populism in Europe. As part of FAEF, Casarotto is determined to defend the legacy of years of painful European construction as well as contribute to turning Europe into a veritable federation, working from the bottom and up

I ask him about federalism, why it is often presented as a more democratic political structure, but also why it seems so hard to trigger a proper debate on federalism in Europe and what can be done to catch more attention from the media and public opinion.

Could you explain in a few words the difference between the current structure of the EU and the kind of federal Europe that FAEF promotes?
In a federation you have a federal body and several sovereign member states. The member states share their sovereignty with the federal body, asking that body to take care of a limited set of specific powers (for instance defence and foreign policy, intelligence, general civil rights legislation, environmental protection, currency, etc.). All the other areas remain in the hands of the members states. The federation takes care only of the common interests of all member states; interests and problems that can no longer be solved by the individual states. The actual EU is not a federation, it is instead an ‘intergovernmental system’. It is not based on a constitution but on treaties or agreements on specific policy areas. If the governments reach an agreement, they can take any decision within the Council, without any limitations, because, unlike a federal system, you don’t have a constitution clearly defining the limits of the powers of federal governance.

Is a federal structure more democratic? Why?
Because, even if we have a European Parliament whose members are elected by the European citizens, all the important decisions are taken by the heads of government in the Council, in closed-door meetings. Sometimes they take decisions that erode individual countries’ sovereignty, including fields where this is not necessary and then you have lack of democracy. And if they don’t agree on anything, they can’t take decisions and you have the current paralysis. This has led to Brexit and disaffection towards the EU.

Why is it difficult for people to understand what federalism is?
Because nobody explains it to them! And it is a shame, a lack of constitutional, political and sociological knowledge if you consider that federalism is already part of the philosophical heritage of Europe and that, for instance, it was developed in the United States of America more than two centuries ago based on the thought of European philosophers like Kant, Montesquieu, Locke, Rousseau, Althusius and others.

Who wants a federal Europe today?
If you think that there are issues for which the power and capacity for action of our small, individual European states is not sufficient anymore, you are probably in favour of a strong, fair cooperation among them. This must indeed include an administrative and governing body that takes care of these common interests with a real democratic checks-and-balances system in place. Do you agree with this? Probably, yes. At the same time, it is likely you believe that each country should maintain its autonomy, preserve its peculiarities, culture, institutions, language, which is all quite reasonable. Then you are a federalist, and you are in favour of the federalization of Europe.

Would a federal structure in Europe help addressing pressing public policy areas such as climate change and migration?
I reverse the question. Is it possible to solve the migration and climate change crises if states deal with them by their own, without any coordination or with different, maybe even conflicting approaches? Nobody can be so foolish to think so. Only a federal Europe will developing enough critical mass and coordination to develop fair agreements on such fundamental questions together with the other main global actors. If a player is small and divided it will have no power in the future global structure.

Many people think that a federal Europe means countries lose their specificities and blend into a homogenous political entity. Is this the case?
No, a federation is not a super-state which abolishes the peculiarities of all the individual states because, if the federal constitution is built the right way, there is a barrier between the limited set of powers that the member states share with the federal body and the powers that remain with the member states. The federal government cannot trespass this barrier because the constitution does not allow it. While, unfortunately, this is possible under article 352 of the intergovernmental Treaty of Lisbon currently in place: the governments can come up with a new treaty or agreement any time and regulate any aspect of the life of each of our countries. We don’t have this barrier, and the weak control of the European Parliament is insufficient to prevent abuses.

If a federal Europe would benefit ordinary Europeans while allowing them to preserve their national identities, why is it so challenging to make both the idea and the discussion attractive to a majority of people?
Again, because of the extensive lack of knowledge, considering that even a lot of politicians do not have a clear idea of what federalism really is and they confuse it with more ‘intergovernmentalism’. 99 per cent of politicians do not know enough about federalism, and some of the few who know are discouraged. They consider it a pornographic word given that the political discussion around them is corrupted by lack of knowledge and the need to drug electoral campaigns with the lure of quick, simplistic and immediate promises in order to be elected. This is populism, after all.

What is the role of FAEF in this sense?
To explain federalism and the potential of its accurate application to the European citizens. We also need to create a federation that includes all the organisations that are in favour of a more united and stronger Europe, so that we can put together our forces, and show in practice what federalism is in theory. After all, if the federalists are not able to federate themselves, how can they preach to countries to federalize?

In particular, how do you think that younger generations can be reached and involved in the debate about federalism?
By honestly speaking to them, answering their questions, involving them through both traditional methods such as schools, lectures, books, and new ones such as social media. Federalism is not rocket science, just the right application of a few logic key concepts, which are already part of European cultural heritage.

One of your members, Catherine Guibourg, suggests that literature and drama are among the most powerful means to explore Europe, its challenges and possibilities. Do you have any ideas or projects in this regard?
Yes, Catherine has written a theatrical play Nous, le peuple européen: six personnages en quête d’Europe (We the European people: six characters in search of Europe) that is currently performing very well in France. This is a different approach to engage people, discuss with them about Europe and federalism as a possible solution. We need a frank discussion, involving not only the establishment but the whole of civil society.

Many people fear the result of the upcoming European elections – specifically, the consolidation of a powerful alliance of the extreme right in the European Parliament. How does FAEF approach the elections and what do you expect from them?
We are not a party. We don’t run for elections or make electoral campaigns. The nature of FAEF is to involve all the movements that are in favour of a more united Europe. They can come from the left, the centre or the right, be progressive, conservative, liberal, provided they are democratic and accountable, and agree on the goal of creating a European Federation. As sovereign forces, they are free to participate in elections or support electoral campaigns. Meanwhile, we play a different role.

Europe, the first world economy, is actually like a Ferrari with a 70-year old engine inside it which simply cannot work in a modern luxury car. This old engine is the intergovernmental system. We need to change it before it is too late.